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Supreme Court Watch
Recent Decisions of Selected Criminal Cases | By Joe Hernandez

FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
Docket Number: 11-345
Argument: October 10, 2012
Issue:
Whether the University of Texas at Austin violated the
Fourteenth Amendment by explicitly using race as a criterion for
in-state applicants for the purpose of increasing enrollment of
Hispanic and African-American
applicants.
Facts:
The University of Texas at
Austin (“UT”) denied Petitioner,
Abigail Fisher, a white female,
admission to UT when she
failed to achieve admission
against minority applicants
who had lesser credentials as
measured by standardized tests
and grades. Students who attend
a Texas public high school are
automatically offered admission
to UT if they achieve a ranking in the top 10% of their graduating class. Otherwise, race is among a range of factors used to
evaluate a student’s application.
Fisher was ranked 82nd in her 674-person class at Stephen
F. Austin High School after having earned a 3.59 out of a
possible 4.0 grade point average. Having failed to achieve
admission through a top 10% ranking in her high school, Fisher
was evaluated against the larger pool of students seeking general
admission. When she was not admitted, she filed suit against
UT, arguing that the school’s use of race as a factor in admission violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The District Court sided
with UT that its policies conformed to the standard set in Grutter
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). The United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s
decision, and denied a rehearing on banc by a 9-7 vote.
In response to Hopwood v. Texas (5th Cir. 1996), a
case prohibiting the use of race in admissions, UT adopted
admissions policies designed to be race neutral. Specifically,
a Personal Achievement Index (“PAI”) score is calculated based
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on two written essays that an applicant submits in conjunction
with “personal achievement scores” that includes grades and
standardized test scores, as well as “special circumstances”
such as socio-economic status, language(s) spoken at home
other than English, parental status, etc. Those scores are calculated then graphed with admission decision based on how well
a person performs relative to the whole applicant pool.
UT argues that its decision to use race as a factor in
admissions conforms to the standard set in Grutter by assuring
race is only among several
factors used to achieve a
“critical mass” of minority students. However,
Fisher claims that race is
a predominate factor that
does not pass strict scrutiny
review, as set out under
Grutter. The replacement
of Justice O’Connor with
Justice Alito, in light of
spectacle questioning
by Alito, Chief Justice
Roberts, and Justice Scalia,
indicates to many that Grutter will either be narrowed or outright overruled.

MONCRIEFFE V. HOLDER
Docket Number: 11-702
Argument: October 10, 2012
Issue:
Whether a conviction under state law for the distribution
of a minimal amount of marijuana qualifies as an aggravated
felony.
Facts:
This case involves a Jamaica native, Adrian Moncrieffe,
who was admitted to the United States lawfully in 1984 as a
permanent resident. While in Georgia, he was found to be in
possession of enough marijuana to make approximately two
joints. He pled guilty to the charges in a Georgia court to
possession with intent to distribute. The Department of
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Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him
for being an alien convicted of an aggravated felony and as an
alien convicted of a controlled substance offense. An immigration judge concurred with the government that Moncrieffe’s
crime constituted an “aggravated felony” and was therefore a
removable offense.
Moncrieffe is not challenging his conviction. Instead, he
is asserts that his offense—the possession of the marijuana—
was not an “aggravated felony” permitting his removal. The
case and the statutory basis for it represent a complicated mix
of federal and state law. First, the immigration judge initially
determined that while state law formed the basis of Moncrieffe’s
conviction, the similarities between it and federal law were
sufficient that his possession of marijuana would be a felony
under federal law. The Board of Immigration Appeals and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concurred
with the immigration judge.
The case may seem simple on its face, however, the
nature of immigration law provides categorical authority to
the Attorney General and delegated officers to exercise certain
measures of discretion that creates a sort of gray area as to
what conditions must be met before exercising that discretion.
Moncrieffe argued in effect that the amount he possessed was
simply not a felony under federal law and state law definitions
cannot trump or substitute a federal definition when relating
to a subject of federal law. The government countered that the
policy preference of Congress was to establish that seemingly
small, misdemeanor crimes at the state level when overlapping with federal law could subject a person to removal. In
oral arguments, reaction to this argument seemed to evoke
skepticism since it requires piecing together several disparate
sets of federal laws that the statute in question does not seem
to invite. Regardless, the case has serious implications for
immigrant defendants that face potentially minor, insignificant
drug possession cases.

FLORIDA V. JARDINES
Docket: 11-564
Argument: October 31, 2012
Issue:
Whether a dog sniff of the front door by a trained narcotics
detection dog based on an anonymous tip that a marijuana
growing operation was occurring inside, constitutes a Fourth
Amendment search requiring probable cause.
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Facts:
Police officers received an anonymous tip that Joelis
Jardines was using his home to grow marijuana. The MiamiDade Police Department in conjunction the Drug Enforcement
Agency conducted warrantless surveillance of the home, and
observed no apparent activity in and around the home. During
the course of the surveillance, a drug-sniffing dog and its
handler walked up to the front of the house. The dog gave a
positive alert when it sniffed the front door. Based on this
positive alert, the police sought a full warrant to search the
house that confirmed the premises were being used as a grow
house. Prior to approaching the house, police admittedly did not
have probable cause based on the anonymous tip that Jardines
was running a marijuana growing operation.
Jardines makes three distinct arguments. First, the prevailing
assumption accepted by the Court in prior cases that dog sniffs
are sui generis and detect only for contraband that a person cannot form a legitimate expectation of privacy is simply is wrong.
Scientific data and information have tended to suggest that
dog sniffs are not as reliable as previously thought with tests
showing a range of critical factors that can lead to false alerts.
For instance, the substance methyl benzoate is a component of
cocaine that is also found in flowers, perfumes, and food additives. The State of Florida and amicus briefs filed in its support
highlight the indispensable success that government agents
have with detecting contraband, specifically marijuana, through
dog sniffs. They assert the track record reveals the overall
effectiveness of dog sniffs.
Second, allowing dog sniffs of homes without probable
cause will lead to indiscriminate invasions of privacy of people’s
homes since law enforcement will be permitted to conduct wide
sweeps based on mere hunches and intuition. Florida responds
to this charge by claiming that such concerns are irrational. Dog
sniffs are a time consuming measures that require highly trained
and expensive police dogs. The state does not have an interest
in using that resource poorly, and the concern of neighborhood
sweeps is impractical. Moreover, they have never happened.
Third, the expectation of privacy in the home is greater than
anyplace where the sui generis standard has previously been
applied. In all other cases the item searched was either a piece
of luggage, car, or item that has been exposed in a public forum
due to the defendant’s own actions. With Jardines, though, the
police action encroached specifically onto an area that is not
transportable or historically granted anything except the highest
expectation of privacy. Florida argues that the path leading up
to the home is public in nature because police officers, visitors,
and mailmen necessarily walk up to without actually peering
inside the home. This Florida asserts respects the sanctity
of the home.
The Court’s decision will have a serious impact whichever
way it resolves the case.
Fall 2012

CHAIDEZ V. UNITED STATES
Docket Number: 11-820
Argument: November 1, 2012
Issue:
Whether the Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.
Ct. 1473 (2010) holding that the failure of attorneys of criminal
defendants to advise their clients that pleading guilty to an
offense will subject the defendant to deportation constitutes
ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment,
applies to persons whose convictions became final before its
announcement.
Facts:
Roselva Chaidez immigrated to the United States from
Mexico to move to the United States in 1971, and became a
lawful permanent resident six years later. After being indicted
on three counts of mail fraud in connection with an insurance
scheme in 2003, Chaidez, on the advice of her attorney, pleaded
guilty and received a sentence of four years probation. In 2009,
the U.S. government began removal proceedings against
Chaidez, under a federal law allowing for the deportation of
any alien who commits an aggravated felony.
Chaidez filed for a writ of coram nobis, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. The U.S. Supreme Court then issued
Padilla v. Kentucky. The district court concluded that the Padilla
holding applied to Chaidez’s case. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however, reversed, reasoning
that Padilla announced a new rule, and was not retroactively
applicable in this case.
In Padilla, an individual who had pleaded guilty to a state
offense sought post-conviction relief. Padilla’a post-conviction
motion for relief argued that his counsel’s failure to advise him
that his guilty plea would subject him to virtually automatic
deportation constituted constitutionally “deficient performance”
under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland
articulated a two-prong test for assessing when “counsel’s
assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction.”
First, “the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was
deficient.” Second, the defendant must show that he suffered
prejudice. In Padilla, the Court held that there was deficient
assistance of counsel, focusing especially on the “prevailing
professional norms” and “the practice and expectations of the
legal community” at the time of the plea.
Chaidez focuses on the retroactivity of the Padilla holding.
Specifically, Chaidez argues that the Court should not hold
that a new rule is created whenever Strickland’s precedent
is applied in divergent factual settings for two reasons. First,
precedent dictated Padilla’s result; like other Strickland cases
that came before it, the Court in Padilla applied Strickland’s
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rule for evaluating attorney performance according to prevailing
professional norms to a new set of facts. Second, the lower
courts who ruled against applying Strickland distinguished
between acts and omission rather than between deportation
advice and other types of advice given by an attorney to his
client. Additionally, Chaidez emphasized that in the twenty
years since this Court decided Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989), there have been more than a dozen cases in which
people have sought habeas relief based on ineffective assistance
of counsel, but the Supreme Court has never once held that
applying Strickland in those divergent factual settings constituted a new rule. The United States countered that Padilla in
fact created a new rule and could not be applied retroactively by
Chaidez in collaterally attacking her conviction. This case will
have important repercussions for attorneys working in immigration law, and their clients. Moreover, this case highlights the
intersection between the criminal law and immigrant law fields.

BAILEY V. UNITED STATES
Docket: 11-770
Argument: November 1, 2012
Issue:
Whether police officers may detain a person when executing
a search warrant after the individual has left the immediate
vicinity before the warrant is executed.
Facts:
The case involves whether the standard set under Michigan
v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692 (1981)—which provides law
enforcement with the authority to detain individuals during
the execution of a search warrant—extends to situations in
which law enforcement observes a person leaving his premises
immediately prior to execution of a search warrant of one’s
home. In Bailey, police officers who observed Bailey leaving
his apartment, stopped him about three-quarters of a mile from
the premises. The officials proceeded to search him whereupon
they found a key that was later learned to open the front door of
his house. Bailey also made statements connecting him to the
premises in question. The search of Bailey’s basement apartment turned up drugs and a gun that led to Bailey’s conviction
for possession of both.
The central issue in the case centers on whether Summers
provides law enforcement with the ability to detain individuals
outside the immediate vicinity of where the search of a home
is be executed. Attorneys for the defendant argue Summers
was limited to the “immediate vicinity” and that the standard
under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)—reasonable suspicion
that a person was committing a crime—must be shown before
police can detain and seize a person outside that immediate
65

vicinity. Moreover, the policy reasons underlying Summers were
to provide protection to police by fully securing the premises
to be searched. One additional concern expressed during oral
argument by Bailey’s attorney is that extending Summers outside the immediate vicinity would enable law enforcement to
detain individuals with any connection to a location.
The government responded that they were not advancing a rule that enables individual’s to be detained who have a
mere connection to a premise. Instead, law enforcement must
establish an observable connection between the individual and
premises, and the original safety concerns articulated under
Summers are still applicable even when the person has left the
premises. Several of the justices appeared skeptical of this argument and seemed to suggest it was too broad relative to the
Fourth Amendment’s probable cause and particularity standard.
Additionally, extending Terry would make individuals caught
in Bailey’s circumstance would make him subject to arrest,
therefore only Summers properly covers the situation.
The Court’s decision could have a sweeping impact on
the scope of a search warrant. Siding with the government’s
position could seemingly enable law enforcement to search
and detain a person with little actual connection to a premise.
However, the “immediate vicinity” test argued by Bailey may
be too narrow to fulfill the safety rationale initially articulated
under Summers.

At trial, the defendant moved to suppress the results of the
blood test as a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The
Missouri Supreme Court disagreed with the Missouri Court of
Appeals and affirmed the ruling of the trial court, holding that
the nonconsensual and warrantless blood draw was a violation
of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches of his person. The Missouri Supreme
Court, reasoning that Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757 (1966) was expressly limited to its facts, noted that the
patrolman was not confronted with these same “special facts,”
and concluded that exigent circumstances did not exist for the
warrantless seizure.
This case represents an opportunity for the Supreme
Court to rectify a clear and increasing split of authority, which
has developed among state courts of last resort. Some courts
have interpreted Schmerber broadly, holding that the natural
dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream is sufficient to create
exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless blood draw in
drunk-driving related crimes. Other courts have a more restrictive
view, amounting to a decision that Schmerber is limited to its
“special facts.” Missouri argues that due to the divide in jurisprudence among state courts, this case is a prime candidate for
certiorari; whereas McNeely argues that this case is an inappropriate vehicle for the court to handle the larger issue—when
exigent circumstances justify a nonconsensual and warrantless
blood draw—due to the special facts presented by this case and
issues like an undeveloped and incomplete factual record.

MISSOURI V. MCNEELY
Docket Number: 11-1425
Argument: January 9, 2013
Issue:
Whether a law enforcement officer may obtain a nonconsensual and warrantless blood sample from a driver, allegedly
driving while intoxicated, under the exigent circumstances
exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement based
upon the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream.
Facts:
After stopping the defendant’s truck for speeding,
a Missouri state highway patrolman noticed signs of intoxication and conducted a DWI investigation. After the defendant
performed poorly on sobriety tests and refused a breath test, the
officer drove the defendant to a local hospital to test his blood
to secure evidence of his intoxication. The officer did not seek
a warrant. There, over the defendant’s refusal, the officer
directed a phlebotomist to draw the defendant’s blood for
alcohol testing at 2:33 a.m. The blood sample was analyzed,
and the results revealed that the blood-alcohol content was well
above the legal limit.
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MARYLAND V. KING
Docket Number: 12-207
Argument: February 26, 2013
Issue:
Whether a state law allowing police to collect and analyze
DNA from people arrested and charged with serious crimes
violates the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
Facts:
The State of Maryland’s DNA Collection Act provides
law enforcement the discretion to collect DNA samples from
individuals for a crime of violence. This includes attempted
crimes of violence, burglary, attempted burglary, rape, and
molestation. The defendant, Alonzo Jay King, was arrested for
first and second degree assault charges. During the duration
between arrest and trial, King’s DNA sample was matched to
a sample from an unsolved rape case where the DNA was the
only piece of evidence linking King to the rape. The victim
was unable to identify the attacker. A motion to suppress the
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DNA evidence was denied and King was eventually convicted
of first-degree rape and sentenced to life in prison.
The case invites a new analysis into the question set out
under U.S. v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967): (1) Does an individual
form an expectation of privacy in their DNA? (2) Is that expectation of privacy one that society is prepared to recognize as
legitimate? In Katz and later cases, the Court has articulated that
the balance between individual expectations of privacy is in part
weighed against the nature of the government interest at stake.
The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding
the law that permitted police to extract King’s DNA without
a particularized warrant violated the Fourth Amendment since
King’s expectation of privacy exceeded the apparent government interest at stake.
The briefs in the case are heavily focused on the question as
to what degree of privacy a pretrial detainee can expect before
the period of conviction, and whether the Fourth Amendment’s
particularity standard is fulfilled under Maryland’s DNA
Collection Act. Maryland argues that the interest to resolve
violent crimes that are otherwise unable to be solved without DNA matches is a legitimate government interest that is
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sufficiently particularized in light of practical limitations.
The respondent claims that DNA evidence, more than most
other information, should be provided the highest degree of
protection, and that the law creates a general warrant against
pretrial detainees.

About the Author
Joe Hernandez is a second year student at American
University Washington College of Law. For the 20122013 academic year, he is the Executive Editor for the
Criminal Law Brief. Originally from the suburbs of
Boston, Joe lived in Wilmington, Delaware during his
high school years before returning to New England for
college at Yale University. Outside of school he is an avid
golfer, and worked last summer at the Maryland Public
Defender’s Office in Prince George’s County. His legal
interests include criminal defense, white collar crime, class
action litigation, government contracts, and immigration.

67

